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Abstract
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The purpose of this study is to identify firm safety practices, safety technologies,
and firm characteristics that are related to motor carrier accident rates. The theory of the
firm suggests that firms maximize profit by investing in safety practices and safety
technologies until marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit. The data set used in the
empirical analysis is unique, in that it will allow for testing of the relationship between
firm safety performance and safety practices, new safety technologies, and firm
marketing strategies. By testing the impact of the safety performance marketing strategy
on carrier accident rates, it can be shown that firm managershave control over the
safety performance of their firm through management decisions.
The results indicate that firms with a safety performance marketing strategy
have significantly lower accident rates. All tested technologies, and most safety
practices, are found to be negatively related to carrier accident rates. These results
support the idea that through investment policies, safety practices, and choice of
marketing strategy managers have a direct impact on their carrier accident rate.
Interestingly, the firm characteristics of unionization and use of owner-operators are
found to reduce carrier accident rates the most. This suggests that motor carrier
managers should consider their firm's characteristics in their managementof carrier
safety.
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Introduction
Safety in the motor carrier industry has been a topic of public concern dating
back to the infancy of the industry. Since that time the U.S. motor carrier industry has
undergone many structural, technical, and regulatory changes. Government safety
regulations, safety-related technologies, and firm safety practices have evolved,
producing a general trend of improved safety in transportation industries (McCarthy,
2001, pp. 564-566).
Economic deregulation of the motor carrier industry gave rise to a wealth of
economic literature focusing on the safety effects of deregulation. Within this literature
areas of concern include the effect of new entrants, the effect of declining profitability
due to increased competition (the profit-safety relationship), and mode shifting.
Research since deregulation has focused on the physical conditions in the causation of
accidents, driver characteristics, and government safety regulations. Less common has
been research focused on carrier management policies and firm safety behavior, an
exception being Corsi and Fanara (1988).
How do firms make safety related decisions? The theory of the firm suggests
that firms should invest in safety practices and technologies until marginal cost is equal
to the marginal benefit of the reduction in the carrier accident rate. The theoretical
framework of this paper proposes that in the face of uncertainty regarding the
occurrence of vehicle accidents, firms maximize expected profit by choosing an optimal
output level and an optimal mix of safety inputs.
Despite the general trend of improved safety in the motor carrier industry, safety
remains a top priority for the industry and government safety regulators. Aggressive
safety goals have been set by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA), including reducing truck-related fatalities by50percent by the end of the
decade (GAO, 2000). New safety and monitoring technologies will play a crucial role in
increasing motor carrier safety in the coming decades. Although adoption rates of mostsafety technologies were still relatively low in 1996, this paper tests the relationship
between the carrier accident rate and three promising technologies; collision avoidance
systems, on-board computer monitoring, and automated vehicle diagnostics systems.
The empirical section of this paper tests the effects of safety practices,
technologies, and firm characteristics on the earner injury and fatality accident rates.
Safety practices include safety meetings, firm speed limit, motorist "call-in" number,
and apprenticeship training programs. Firm characteristics tested in this paper are; firm
size, less-than-truck load (LTL) carriers, and use of owner-operators, unionization, and
the firm marketing strategies, on-time-performance and safety performance.3
Background and Literature
Regulation and Deregulation
Some of the first government safety regulations, implemented in the 1 930s,
were rules governing the amount of rest needed between driving shifts, called hours-
of-service regulations. Hours-of-service regulations were adopted primarily to protect
drivers from being forced to work unsafe driving schedules. Monaco and Williams
(2000) give a detailed description of the hours-of-service requirements, and note that
hours-of-service regulations have changed little since they were first put into practice.
Fearing increased competition from motor carriers, railroads supported
government regulation of the fledgling motor carrier industry to protect them from
truck competition. The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 placed the industry under the
control of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The ICC controlled entry and
exit from the industry and issued operating licenses for individual routes and
commodities. The ICC also had the responsibility to oversee truck and rail rates. The
ICC regulation backfired on the railroads as the low rate differential between rail and
truck resulted in high valued, time-sensitive commodities shifting to truck freight.
Over the nearly half-century of economic regulation there were significant
technological advancements and government intervention that benefited the motor
carrier industry. The government invested heavily in the interstate highway system,
while railroads experienced financial decline. Railroads were unable to maintain the
railroad infrastructure, which lead to slower rail speeds, bolstering the competitive
advantage of the motor carrier industry. Government investment in the interstate
highway system dramatically enhanced the motor carrier industry's competitive edge
over rail through greater route flexibility and delivery time performance (McMullen,
2000).
Lave (1968) focused on the role of government in providing transportation
safety. Asserting, "We can be too safe," he goes on to make the case that safety is a4
scarce resource (p. 512). This article is noteworthy for adiscussion on transportation
safety because it is one of the first articles on the subject, and it clearly identifies
transportation safety as an economic good; there are tradeoffs required to achieve
higher levels of safety.
Lave indirectly questions whether there was too much safety provided in the
regulated transportation industries, because train, bus, air passenger-fatality rates were
all significantly lower than private automobile passenger-fatality rates. If regulated
freight rates were above the competitive levels that would have existed in a non-
regulated industry, economic regulation may have induced safety spending above the
level firms would have chosen in a competitive environment. Specifically, rate-of-
return regulation likely resulted in over-investment in capital (Traynor & McCarthy,
1991). Safety may have also been higher because of premium wages paid to union
drivers, which would have resulted in the employment of more experienced drivers.
Because firms could go to the ICC and request rate increases, union demands were
often viewed as "pass through" costs. It is argued that high wages and union demands
increased driver safety incentives. Certainly as the industry moved toward
deregulation many argued that economic regulation promoted higher safety
performance, and that deregulation would lead to a decrease in industry safety.
Although academic research as early as the 1 950s demonstrated that regulation
created inefficiencies and significant rents to transportation industries, it was not until
1980 that deregulatory legislation became law. President John F. Kennedy supported
deregulation in 1962, however the movement toward deregulation faced strong
opposition by the Teamsters and industry groups such as the American Trucking
Association (ATA), stalling deregulation efforts until the late 1 970s. Greater social
acceptance of market forces gave the support needed to begin the gradual process of
market deregulation. The first movement toward deregulation occurred in 1975 when
the ICC modified rules to promote more competition in the trucking industry. By
1979, the ICC had eliminated rules that prevented competition between contract and
common carriers. Following this move, the ICC proposed "relaxing entry standardsand freeing rates for a significant portion of the trade" (Moore, 2002, P.7).The Motor
Carrier Regulatory Reform and Modernization Act of1980(MCA) significantly
deregulated the motor carrier industry, however complete deregulation of the industry
did not occur until the mid1990swhen the ICC was abolished. As a result of the
MCA, real rates for shippers decreased, many new firms entered the trucking industry,
and there was a dramatic decrease in industry profit. Perhaps the most controversial
public issue concerning deregulation of the motor carrier industry and the passage of
the MCA were the safety effects of the impending deregulation (Moore, 2002).
Along with the passage of the MCA came an explosion of deregulation
literature, including safety-deregulation literature. Prominent topics in the
deregulation-safety literature include the effect of new entrants and the profit-safety
relationship. The new entrants literature focused on the increased entry of small new
firms and the occurrence of "fly-by-night" firms. New firms with inexperienced
managers, young and inexperienced drivers, along with the lack of financial backing
were thought to pose the most serious threats for decreased industry safety. The
profit-safety relationship literature focuses on the safety effects due to declining
profits. It was believed that increased competition would cause firms to "cut corners"
particularly with regard to maintenance and safety expenditures.
The preeminent source for deregulation-safety articles and complete
bibliography is the book "Safety in an Age of Deregulation" edited by Moses and
Savage(1989).Papers in this book are from a deregulation and safety conference at
the Transportation Center of Northwestern University. Both sides of the deregulation-
safety issue are presented, along with chapters discussing the theoretical
underpinnings of safety-deregulation arguments. This book covers both the airline and
motor carrier industry, and addresses the profit-safety relationship, new entrants,
congestion, as well as mode shifting.
Profit-safety literature is strongly connected to the literature on the safety
effects of industry deregulation circa, the late 1970sand1980.The most significant
and recent paper concerning the profit-safety relationship in the trucking industry isBeard (1992). Beard finds evidence that supports the profit-safety relationship; more
profitable carriers are safer. Beard criticizes previous attempts for data problems and
use of wrong measures for safety and financial condition; he uses roadside safety
inspection data as a proxy for firm safety. Beard uses a cash-flow method to evaluate
risky firms and probit model to test the profit-safety relationship (with the dependent
being the probability a vehicle is taken out of service upon inspection). Mixon and
Upadhyaya (1996) provide a note on Beard's 1992 paper, using the same data and a
two-stage least squares approach, they test the relationship between carrier accident
rates and asset specificity and firm size.
Corsi and Fanara (1989) is the preeminent study on the safety effects of new
entrants. Examining new entrants versus established carriers in the years 1980-1984,
their study finds that new entrants have accident rates between 27% and 33% higher
than the average accident rate for the established carriers. For the "newest' of the
new entrants," the accident rate is nearly 70% higher than the average established
carrier (p. 255). The safety effect of new entrants may have been masked in aggregate
studies due to the relatively small size of new firms, and increasing safety from
teclmology and safety regulations.
The explosion of transportation deregulation-safety literature was not limited
to the motor carrier industry. The ideological shift toward reliance on markets resulted
in deregulation in the airline industry, and to a lesser extent, deregulation of the
railroads. The safety effect of mode shifting, primarily the shift of freight
transportation from rail to highway has been a focus of research.
Notable in the airline-safety deregulation literature are Golbe (1986) and Rose
(1990). Golbe (1986) examines the safety-profit relationship in the airline industry.
The theoretical model does not suggest a relationship between profit level and firm
safety, rather cost and demand structure andriskpreference influence safety
preference in Golbe's model. Empirical results of a simultaneous equations model did
not find a relationship between financial condition and safety performance. Rose
(1990), using a Poisson regression model found that lower profitability was correlated7
with higher accident rates, particularly for smaller airlines. For more on airline safety
see Moses and Savage (1989), and Rose (1992). The safety effects of deregulation of
rail received less attention. Readers are referred to Golbe (1983) and Boyer (1989).
Overall, the literature is mixed as to the impact of deregulation on motor
carrier safety. Traynor and McCarthy (1991, 1993) using aggregate California
highway accident data, found that highway safety is independent of the economic
environment and safety actually improved in the years following deregulation.
Alexander (1992) finds that fatality and injury rates are lower, but the collective
accident rate was unaffected by deregulation. Alexander goes on to recommend that
safety expenditures at the firm level should be examined to see the change in safety
inputs after deregulation, but he also notes there is a lack of data. Moore (1989) uses
simple comparisons of fatality and injury accident rates to conclude that deregulation
did not have a negative impact on safety.
Evidence supporting the negative safety effects of deregulation is found in the
analysis by Daicoff (1988), who finds that safety was improving prior to deregulation,
and safety continued to improve after deregulation but at a slower rate. Chow (1989)
finds little evidence between financial condition and safety related activities, but
notes, "as financial fitness improved, equipment was replaced [more often] and less
use was made of owner-operators" (p. 239). Using this evidence to conclude
deregulation had a negative impact on safety assumes that use of owner-operators is
negatively related to carrier safety, and that equipment age is a significant factor in
accidents. The strongest evidence of the negative safety effects due to deregulation is
the effect of new entrants, who had dramatically higher accident rates in the first few
years after the passage of the MCA compared to the established carriers (Corsi &
Fanara, 1989).
With no clear consensus as to the safety effects of deregulation, one may
cautiously conclude that deregulation had very little to no effect on safety. The
mixture of results in the literature is primarily due to the poor quality accident data
and the gradual time span over which deregulation occurred. In addition there were[]
[1
"significant changes in vehicle technology and important safety regulation changes in
the early years following the MCA 1980" that likely impacted safety performance of
the industry (Moses & Savage, 1989, p. 218).
The Motor Carrier Industry and Safety Since Deregulation
Deregulation only eliminated the economic regulations imposed by the ICC.
Government safety regulations, if anything, have become more stringent since the
MCA of 1980. Title IV of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982
established the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP); the Commercial
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 strengthened the MCSAP, and the Motor Carrier
Safety Improvement Act of 1999 created the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) (Adams, 1989; GAO, 2000). Motor carrier safety literature
has not been as prevalent since deregulation, with most recent motor carrier safety
research focusing on the physical conditions of accidents, and driver characteristics.
According to an article in the trucking magazine Fleet Owner, "beyond
insurance and maintenance, there are few avenues left where fleets can cut operational
costs." Firms that want to cut insurance costs need "to eliminate accidents, which will
also reduce repair and replacement costs" (Kilcarr, 2000, p. 6). This accurately
describes the fiercely competitive modern U.S. trucking industry. Safety is recognized
as one of the last areas where carriers can cut operational costs. Cutting costs through
safety is not necessarily synonymous with the "cutting corners" argument from
deregulation literature. Through management practices and new technologies, firms
are able to find the optimal mix of safety inputs to reduce insurance, litigation, and
worker compensation costs. Adoption of safety technologies is of particular interest as
a method for increasing motor carrier safety.
The popularity of motor carrier safety in economics literature has decreased
since its height in the years following the passage of the MCA. More recent literature
falls into two categories; factors related to crashes and government safety regulations.Literature on crash related factors can be further divided into physical factors
(environment, road type, vehicle type, etc.), firm related characteristics, and driver
characteristics. There are numerous government, industry, and engineering studies
examining the physical and mechanical aspects of truck crashes. Less common are
articles focusing on firm behavior, firm and driver characteristics, and the
effectiveness of government safety regulations.
Monaco and Williams (2001) is a recent article focusing on carrier and driver
characteristics. Using Michigan driver survey data, the analysis focuses on three
dependent variables, occurrence of an accident, moving violation, and logbook
violation. Occupational characteristics are found to be more significant than driver
demographic characteristics.
Corsi, Fanara, and Roberts (1984) examine the relationship between carrier
accident rates and compliance with various safety regulations. Interestingly, they find
that non-compliance with hours-of-service regulation is negatively related to carrier
accident rates, while non-compliance with other safety regulations are all positively
related to carrier accident rates. Both firm size and use of owner-operators are
negatively related to accident rates.
Corsi and Fanara (1988) advocate a management perspective in addressing
firm safety. They argue that managers "have a direct impact on their accident rate" (p.
154). Driver management policies which result in driver turnover rates are of
particular interest and the authors find that driver turnover rates significantly increase
carrier accident rates.
Motor carrier safety has become a top transportation issue for the government.
The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 created the Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) to oversee all motor carrier safety programs. The FMCSA
was created "to give motor carrier safety increased attention and stature within DOT"
(GAO, 2000, p. 2). "There is no more important issue in the trucking industry than
highway safety" according to the ATA (McCormick, 1999). On top of the existing
initiatives to strengthen hours-of-service regulations and roadside inspections, the10
emphasis on safety and security in transportation has taken on a whole new
dimension since 9/11/01.
Despite the increased emphasis on government safety programs, the
effectiveness of government safety programs has received little attention in the
literature; exceptions are Moses and Savage (1997) and Hauer (1989). As the
government focuses more resources on motor carrier safety, new literature should
evaluate the effectiveness of government intervention, specifically the effectiveness of
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. As Moses and Savage (1997)
contend, a major problem with government motor carrier programs is that they are
evaluated by those responsible for administering the safety programs. The GAO
(2000, p. 2) confirms that for many of the new initiatives the "DOT does not expect to
have information for several years that would allow it to estimate the degree to which
its initiatives will reduce truck-related fatalities."
While there is an apparent emphasis on motor carrier safety from the
government, it is the premise of this paper that firms have the largest impact on motor
carrier safety. Government safety regulations play a large role in manipulating firm
incentives to provide higher levels of safety. Looking at safety as an economic good,
there may be justification to question whether the government's goal of reducing
motor carrier related fatalities by 50% by 2009 is an efficient allocation of resources.
In order to achieve this goal, stricter standards and increased funds for government
inspections are needed, and these limitations and enforcement activities will impose
higher costs on the motor carrier firms. Technology is looked to as a solution that will
increase efficiency and safety of the industry. Thus, new safety technologies may
reduce accident rates without placing an excessive cost burden on firms.
This paper adds to the economic literature on motor carrier safety, addressing
motor carrier safety from the firm perspective. In a fashion similar to Corsi and
Fanara (1988), it is the underlying premise of this paper that firms have a direct
impact on their accident rate. Firm managers influence their accident rate through
safety practices, and safety technology adoption, given their firm characteristics. Firm11
management policies and marketing strategies demonstrate that firm managers can
target and successfully impact their carrier's accident rate. Government safety
regulations alone may not be the most effective means for reducing truck-related
crashes. This paper advocates focusing on the behavior of the firm and firm incentives
to adopt new safety technology for increasing motor carrier industry safety. With the
increasing industry and government focus on motor carrier safety and security, it is
again necessary for literature to add to the continued research on the topic and to
evaluate the impact of technology, firm practices and government regulations on
industry safety.12
Theory
This paper approaches the topic of motor carrier safety from the firm
perspective. It is therefore appropriate that the theory of the firm be used as the general
theoretical framework. Following the theory of the firm is discussion of the theory
behind the relationship between motor carrier accident rates and safety inputs and firm
characteristics.
Profit Maximization Under Uncertainty
Motor carrier safety starts with the firm. While government safety regulations
attempt to ensure a minimum level of highway safetyin the form of highway laws and
enforcement, provision of infrastructure and motor carrier safety inspections
ultimately, most trucking safety investment decisions are made at the firm level.
Government safety regulations attempt to discourage or promote certain firm behavior.
Following the basic tenants of the "theory of the firm," firms act to maximize profit and
will invest in safety inputs until the marginal cost of an additional unit of a safety input
is equal to the marginal benefit.
Uncertaintyin many formsplagues the decisions made by economic agents.
Thus, a firm must take into account sources of uncertainty and proceed in making input
and quantity-output decisions by maximizing expected profit. In the motor carrier
industry, one major source of uncertainty is the occurrence of highway crashes.
Assuming the motor carrier industry is perfectly competitive, the firm is a price-
taker. It is further assumed that safety performance of the firm has no noticeable effect
on price. Price may be a function of firm characteristics, such as the type of commodity
hauled, and whether the carrier is a less-than-truckload (LTL) or truckload (TL) carrier.
The firm maximizes expected profit by choosing the level of non-safety inputs, x, and
the amount of safety inputs, s. Output q(x), is a function of non-safety inputs. While13
firms face numerous sources of uncertainty, the model will explicitly consider the
probability of having an accident, (1-G(s; 7)), per unit of output.
The finn's expected profit (Z) contains the vector of firm characteristics,and
the cost function depends upon the level of inputs (non-safety and safety related), and
the price of inputs, w, given the firm characteristics. Damage expenses resulting from
an accident are described by the function, D(y), which depends upon a firm's
characteristics. The firm should maximize the following expected profits (Z) objective
function:
Max Z=P(y)*q(x)_c(x,s,w,y)_(1_ G(s;y))*D(y)*q(x)
x,S
Note thatis the random, critical variable and s is the known firm choice vector of
safety inputs. G is a continuous, differentiable probability distribution function for the
random variable,where shat represents a critical value of safety inputs, above which
no accident occurs. (1 -G(s;y)) is then the probability that an accident occurs,
P( sIr)Thus as investment in safety inputs, s, increases, the probability
P(sy) falls.
Optimal output occurs at the level where the price is equal to the marginal cost
of production, where marginal cost includes all the expected marginal costs of an
accident.
Optimal safety investment, s, occurs when the marginal cost of safety inputs is
equal to the expected benefit of the safety inputs. Benefits in this model are gained from
decreasing the probability of an accident (and thus lower costs from accidents). The
safety performance of the firm, measured by the number of accidents, is the value of (1-
G(s*;y))*q.
Like Golbe's (1986) model, this theoretical framework does not suggest a
relationship between the level of expected profit and safety performance. Financial14
condition of the firm could influence the safety performance of the firm in this
model, if the financial standing of the firm is contained in the vector of firm
characteristics.
Safety Practices and Safety Technology
While data limitations prevent explicit testing of the firm's safety input choices
under expected profit maximization, the empirical section will test the relationship
between safety performance and safety inputs. Safety performance in this model will be
the firm accident rate, A, defined as a function of the firm's safety inputs, s, given the
firm's characteristics, '.
A=f(s;y)
Safety inputs are any safety enhancing policy, practice, or technology. The safety
practices used by firm managers should decrease their firm's crash rate. It is not clear if
some of the safety practices are adopted retroactively. If so, firms with high accident
rates may adopt safety practices with the hope that future accident rates will be lower.
Some safety practices may be more effective in reducing firm accident rates. For
example, many accidents are caused by a combination of factors, with speed as a
common component. Implementing a fleet speed limit would logically seem to have the
ability to drastically reduce firm accident rates. The impact of the safety practices is
likely to vary by the quality of the particular practice.
Firm Characteristics
Firm characteristics are common in motor carrier safety literature. Some firm
characteristics seem to have strong theoretical underpinnings to suggest relationships
with safety performance. Six firm characteristics will be tested in the empirical section.
Each of these six variables will be introduced with a theoretical discussion to suggest a15
relationship between each firm characteristic and safety, along with the expected sign
of the relationship, and any previous empirical results.
Firm size has consistently been inversely related to accident rates. This has been
explained by arguments that larger firms have an advantage with regard to fleet
maintenance, and training programs. They also have the financial means to invest in
new technologies, and often have large safety divisions to carry out firm safety policies
and monitoring. Smaller firms may have difficulty in obtaining safety related
information, and limited capital resources to invest in safety technology.
Owner-operators are drivers that own their tractor and contract their services out
to larger firms. Following principal-agent theory, owner-operators are likely to have
lower accident rates because the drivers will ensure their safety and the continued
operation of their tractor through careful driving and thorough knowledge of their
vehicle operation and maintenance history. The principal-agent theory is tested by
Mixon and Upadhyaya (1996), however their paper looks at the ownership structure of
the firm, not ownership of tractors or trucks by the drivers. Contrary to principal-agent
theory, which suggests that owner-operators have safety inducing incentives, Chow
(1989) cites lower compensation for similar routes, and an inability to acquire resources
needed for maintenance as reasons why owner-operators may have higher accident
rates.
There have been no definitive results on the effect of unionization on firm safety
performance. At the time of deregulation the motor carrier industry was heavily
unionized. New entrants and the need to cut labor costs after deregulation lead to a
decrease in the unionization of the industry. Given unions' goals of promoting worker
safety and compensation, unions likely demand higher safety levels, reasonable route
scheduling, and higher wages, all of which should reduce carrier accident rates. Monaco
and Williams (2001) test union membership in their probit model, but only find a
significantly negative relationship between union membership and moving violations;
and they find the relationship between unions and accidents is insignificantly positive.16
Trucking operations can be divided into the for-hire and private sectors.
Within the for-hire industry there are two major segments: specialized carriers and
general freight carriers. General freight earners can be either truckload (TL) or less-
than-truckload (LTL). Truckload earners handle large shipments transported from one
shipper to a single destination. Less-than-truckload operations often involve hub-and-
spoke operations with many small shipments taken to terminals and distributed to many
locations. The growth of LTL segment has been fueled by technological advancements
and the shift toward just-in-time (JIT) inventory systems. Specialized carriers often are
required to have specialized equipment for hauling such commodities as petroleum,
wood products, and hazardous materials. Specialized carriers tend to engage in
Truckload (TL) operations (McMullen, 2000, p. 142).
Chow (1989) contends that TL carriers expose "drivers to potentially longer and
more irregular hours" (p. 225) because of the irregular turnaroundand line-haul
operations. Chow does not explicitly test LTL/TL carriers because his definition of type
of carrier is based only on percentage of operations in intercity general commodity
freight. Corsi and Fanara (1988, 1989) test general freight carriers versus other types of
commodities and find that general freight carriers have higher accident rates. With
relatively little previous research, the relationship between LTL carriers and firm
accident rate is not clear. If one believes that LTL operations allow for more regular
schedules and familiar routes, then LTL operations may reduce firm accident rates.
However, LTL operations are often time-sensitive, with time performance a top priority,
which may lead LTL operations to increase firm accident rates, with the added
difficulty of intercity operations contending with congested city streets and highways.
This paper will test the relationship between firm marketing strategy and firm
accident rate. Two marketing strategies are included in the empirical section, on-time-
performance (OTP) and safety performance (SAFESTRAT). In the fiercely competitive
environment since deregulation marketing strategies have developed within the motor
carrier industry. Most commonly cited are the contrasting marketing strategies of on-
time performance (OTP) and lowest-freight rate (LFR). An OTP marketing strategy will17
generally inflate operating costs because loads may not be full. The emergence of the
OTP marketing strategy is the result ofjust-in-time inventory systems, consumer and
shipper preference for fast deliveries and is common for carriers of perishable or high
valued commodities. There is no clear expectation as to the relationship between either
OTP and LFR and the firm accident rate, however both seem to have aspects that would
tend to be related with higher accident rates. OTP requires demanding driver schedules,
perhaps violating hours-of-service requirements and creating an incentive to speed.
Firms with a safety performance marketing strategy are likely to engage in
safety enhancing activities in order to market their safety performance. Firms may
provide shippers with information to demonstrate the high degree of safety investment,
and safety performance of the firm. For these reasons it is expected that there is a
negative relationship between SAFESTRAT and carrier accident rate. Embodied with in
the SAFESTRAT variable is the underlying theory that firm management decisions
have a direct impact on their accident rate. Firms have the control to improve their
safety performance if so desired.
In approaching motor carrier safety from the perspective of the firm it is
important to consider the firm choice variables, safety inputs, as well as the variables
that economic theory and previous research deem to be significant. This chapter
introduced the theoretical framework underlying the testing of safety practices,
technology, and firm characteristics.Data, Model, and Results
Data
This study uses firm level data for Class I and Class H motor carriers in 1996.
Data used in this study are from three sources: The American Trucking Association
(ATA) 1996 Motor Carrier Finance and Operating Statistics, the ATA Foundation
'Motor Carrier Safety, Operations and Technology Survey' (MCSOTS), and safety data
from the Safety and Electronic Records System (SAFER). The three data sets are
merged by motor carrier number to produce a unique data set on firm operating
characteristics, safety practice and technology use, and carrier safety performance.
Four of the firm characteristics variables are obtained from the annually reported
motor carrier financial and operating statistics. Use of owner-operators (OOP) is created
as the ratio of miles rented with driver to totalhighway miles. The UNTON dummy
variable is created as a ratio of health and welfare expenditures to total fringe
expenditures. If this ratio is greater than 0.1 then UNION equals one, otherwise UNION
is zero (Kerkvliet & McMullen, 1997). Firm total assets, (reported in millions of
dollars) is used as a proxy for firm size (SIZE). Carrier commodity type is used to
identify those firms that are less-than-truckload (LTL) carriers. The number of injury
accidents and the number of fatal accidents are used to construct the dependent
variables of the regressions.
The ATA, together with the National Private Truck Council collected firm
safety practice, technology and marketing strategy data in the "Motor Carrier Safety,
Operations and Technology Survey" (MCSOTS). This survey included questions on the
use of selected information technology, including some safetyrelated technology and
the use of firm safety practices. Due to low adoption rates of technologies in 1996 and
the fact that most of the technologies in the survey were information technologies, only
three safety-related technologies are included in the empirical analysis; Collision
Avoidance Systems (COLLAV), Automated Vehicle Diagnostics (DIAGN) and on-Fv
board computer monitoring (OBCMON). The safety practices used in this paper are:
firm safety meetings (SAFEMEET), fleet speed limit (FLEETSPEED), and use of an
apprenticeship training programs (APRENT).
On-board computers (OBC) record vehicle operation statistics through sensors
and can present the information to drivers or management and dispatch in real-time or
on a trip-by-trip basis. OBC information can be used to analyzevehicle performance,
particularly fuel consumption, as well as speed, erratic maneuvering and hard stops.
While some OBCs are not designed specifically for safety monitoring (fuel
consumption for example) the MSCOT survey specifically asked about the use of OBC
for safety monitoring. Collision avoidance systems (COLLAV) can also be used for
monitoring driver performance. Through closed-circuit television, infrared or low
frequency radar, COLLAV informs drivers of proximity to obstacles. Automated
vehicle diagnostics systems (DIAGN), are yet another in-vehicle technology that can
enhance safety through monitoring vehicle operation performance and maintenance
activities. Diagnostic and maintenance support systems can assess vehicle performance
and assists in creating optimal maintenance schedules (OMCS, 1999, pp. 4-11).
Safety practices, as mentioned in the theory section are generally initiated and
implemented by the firm. There are a variety of firm safety practices for managers to
choose from. The safety practice variables are all dummy variables indicating whether
the firm uses a particular strategy. The data on safety practices, technology use, and
marketing strategies is unique, but has limitations. For each of the safety practices a
firm uses, there is no additional data to measure quality of the activities of the practices.
There is no stated speed limit for FLEETSPEED, no information on the frequency or
length of safety meetings.
The MSCOT survey is also the source of the marketing strategy data. Firms
were asked to rank five marketing strategies: lowest-freight-rate,on-time-performance,
short turn around, use of specialized and dedicated equipment, and safety performance.
Though there were five options, most carriers can likely be classified as either LFR or
OTP. It would be nice to test the dichotomous nature of the LFR and OTP marketingstrategy, however the survey method of ranking strategies does not lend itself easily
to testing LFR versus OTP firms. In fact, many firms rank OTP and LFR as their first
and second marketing strategies, though each strategy clearly requires a different
operating approach. Finns with the safety performance marketing strategy
(SAFESTRAT) are included in the model. Firms with a marketing strategy of
SAFESTRAT cannot have an OTP marketing strategy due to the way each dummy
variable is defined.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable MeanStd Dev Number of Firms
OBCMON 0.35 1 0.478 181
COLLAV 0.008 0.088 4
DIAGN 0.118 0.323 61
SAFEMEET 0.880 0.325 454
FLEETSPEED 0.800 0.400 413
APRENT 0.436 0.496 225
OTP 0.709 0.455 366
SAFESTRAT 0.072 0.258 37
LTL 0.107 0.309 55
UNION 0.203 0.403 105
OOP 0.248 0.346
SIZE 20.34697.506
The SAFER system collects and disseminates safety data on interstate firms.
The SAFER system is one way that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
hopes to use information technology to increase efficiency and safety of motor carrier
operations. Currently the SAFER system provides carrier profiles for public
information. This allows shippers and the general public access to information on a
specific carrier's accident and inspection history for the previous 12-month period.
SAFER data is also available in an annual catalog form for data analysis purposes. The
1996 SAFER data used in this study includes number and type of inspections (vehicle,21
driver, or hazardous), number of out-of-services, number of accidents (fatal, injury,
and hazardous) and the firm's safety rating issued by the FMCSA. This study uses the
number of reported fatal, FA, and injury accidents, IA, by firm as reported in the
SAFER system.
The use of accident rates in safety literature has often been criticized primarily
because of the lack of reliable truck crash data. The reliability of accident data has been
suspect in the past due to firm reporting of the data, inconsistent reporting standards
across states. Even with accurate crash data some critics argue that accident rates are
inappropriate measures of firm safety because crashes involve many factors that are
outside of the control of the firm. Beard (1992) cites these reasons in his decision to use
inspection rates as proxy for firm safety performance. If safety inspections are closely
correlated with accident rates then this may be a good measure. However, inspection
rates are not perfectly correlated with accidents. It is true that firms do not have
complete control over their accident rates due to the inherent uncertainty of their
operating environment. Studies have concluded however, that environmental factors do
not bias analysis on interstate motor carrier accident rates. In fact, motor carrier
accident rates are fairly independent of road and weather conditions (Corsi et. al., 1984,
p. 149). With stricter reporting standards and thecreation of the SAFER system, carrier
accident data is now much more accurate than it was in the early 1 980s, particularly
reliable are data on fatal and injury accidents.
The Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) provides detailed information
about fatal motor vehicle accidents. FARS is a highly detailed database of fatal
accidents in the U.S. and has been an excellent source of accident causation and
environmental factors for fatality crashes. Accident reporting problems of the past are
improving with federal reporting standards, FARS, and the SAFER System. The
creation of the SAFER system has drastically improved access and the accuracy of
motor carrier accident statistics.22
Model
The first empirical model tests the relationship between the firm injury accident
(IA) rate and firm characteristics, safety practices, and use of safety technology. The IA
model is:
Ln(IARATE)= COLLAV+DIAGN+OBCMON+SAFEMEET+FLEETSPEED
+APRENT+OTP+SAFESTRAT+LTL+UNION+OOP+SIZE+e
The second model is identical to the first except that it uses the fatal and injury accident
rate (FAL&) as the dependent variable.
As discussed in the theory section, the expect signs of the safety practices and
technology dummy variables (parameters bi throughb6) should be negative. Firm
characteristics may have either a positive or negative relationship with the firm accident
rate.
Following the motor carrier accident rate models of Corsi and Fanara (1988,
1989), and Corsi et al. (1984) a semilogarithmic functional form has been chosen for the
model. There is no economic theory to suggest a functional form and as these previous
papers point out, carrier accident rates are distributed approximately log normal. Use of
a semi-log functional form is preferred to the log-log form due to the presence of the
variable owner-operator, which is expressed as a ratio. A logarithmic transformation is
performed on the dependent variable for the semilogarithmic form. Many carriers had
zero injury or fatality accidents reported, thus in order to perform the logarithmic
transformation, a one was added to the number of carrier accidents, then divided by
carrier miles to calculate the two different carrier accident rates. Corsi adds a one to the
accident rate in order to perform the logarithmic transformation, and notes the possible
bias that may result. A mathematical transformation of the coefficients of the dummy
variables will correct for most of this bias, and as Corsi and Fanara (1984) point out,
given the large sample size, consistency of the estimates is assured. Adding a one to the23
number of carrier accidents before dividing by carrier miles to create the accident rate
likely creates less of a bias than the method of Corsi and Fanara (1988).
A convenient result of using the semiloganthmic functional form is the
interpretation of the impact of the various safety practices and firm characteristics. The
coefficients of continuous variables can be multiplied by 100 and then interpreted as the
percentage effect of that variable on the dependent variable. A mathematical
transformation must be performed in order to interpret the coefficients of the dummy
variables as percentage changes.
Kennedy's (1981) approximate unbiased estimator of the percentage change is
used to convert the coefficients of the dummy variables to percentage change. To
transform the coefficient into the percentage effect, the OLS estimate of the coefficient
of a dummy variable,,and the OLS estimate of its variance, V(s), are used in the
following equation:
A recent addition to the literature on the correct interpretation of dummy
variables in semilogarithmic equations is an approximation for an unbiased estimator of
variance (Garderen & Shah 2002, p. 152). Though t-statistics correctly determine the
significance of dummy variables in the model, the approximation for an unbiased
estimator for the variance is a nice complement for Kennedy's estimator. The estimator
for unbiased variance is practical and straightforward to use, and again is a simple
transformation using the OLS estimated coefficient and variance. The equation for the
approximate unbiased variance estimator is:
VCb)1002 exp{2ê}{exp{V(ê)} exp{-2V()}]
These equations are used to calculate the Kennedy approximate percentage change and
the approximate unbiased variance estimator, which are presented in Table 4. As24
Garderen and Shah (2002) comment, these approximations are "very simple, yet
highly reliable," given the assumption of normal disturbances.
While this model tests many firm safety practices and new safety technologies,
as well as several firm characteristics, there are most likely a multitude of other factors
that contribute toward carrier accident rates. Omission of relevant variables may bias
the estimated coefficients. Data is unavailable for some relevant variables, as well as it
is not clear what other variables should be included in the model. As Corsi et. al. (1984)
note "As long as omitted variables are not correlated with the variables included in our
models, omitted variables should not have a substantial influence on the results
presented" (p. 162). The possibility of omitted relevant variables seems to be a common
problem in regressions involving accident rates due to the variety of factors that
contribute to the causation of vehicle accidents.
Results
The results of the injury accident rate (IA) model estimation are shown in Table
3, and the fatality/injury (FAJA) regression results are shown in Table 4. In general, the
results support the theoretical framework of the paper, firms choose safety practices and
technology to decrease carrier accident rate. Four of the thirteen variables are found to
be significant at the 0.Olconfidence level in the IA model; FLEETSPEED,
SAFESTRAT, OOP, and UNION. Other statistically significant variables are:
COLLAV and SAFEMEET. All of the coefficients, except for SAFEMEET, have the
expected (negative) signs.
Comparing the results of the two regressions, the sign of the coefficient on
CALLIN is negative in the IA regression and positive in the FAIA regression. This is
not a reason for alarm since CALLIN is indistinguishable from zero in both regressions.
COLLAV is significant in the IA regression at the 0.05 level, however COLLAV is not
as significant in the FALk model. The opposite is true for APRENT. APRENT is more
significant in the FAIA regression than in the IA regression.25
Inconsistent with theory and prediction is the significantly positive
relationship between SAFEMEET and carrier accident rate. Ex post, an explanation for
this result may be that firm safety meetings are an Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) work rule. Thus, it is possible that many firms implement
safety meetings to comply with worker safety laws, which will lead to use of safety
meetings even if this practice does not decrease the firm accident rate. Firms with high
accident rates may also use the safety meeting safety practice as a remedial tool to help
increase their safety performance.
Interestingly, firm characteristics appear to be some of the most significant
factors influencing firm accident rates. Three of the most significant, negative, variables
in the model are considered firm characteristics: Safety performance marketing strategy,
use of owner-operators and unionization. These negativecoefficients are consistent with
the expectations of these signs. Though unionization is declining in the industry,
unionization appears to overwhelmingly reduce carrier accident rates.
Use of owner-operators is another firm characteristic that is significantly related
to lower carrier accident rates. This result is consistent with the principal-agent theory,
which suggests that drivers that own their tractor or truck have more incentive to engage
in safe driving behavior and safety inducing vehicle maintenance practices. Also
consistent with expectations and previous empirical evidence, is the negative coefficient
on firm size.
There were no clear expectations as to the signs of the coefficients on OTP and
LTL. Both of these variables have positive coefficients in the regression results, though
neither variable is highly significant. The results indicate, though not conclusively, that
OTP and LTL are related to higher accident rates, perhaps because of the time-sensitive
nature of these operations.
The significance of the regressions is tested using an F-statistic. Despite low R-
squared values, the computed F-statistics are 8.08 for the injury accident rate (IA)
regression, and 8.14 for the fatality and injury accident rate (FAIA) regression. The
computed F-statistics confirm the significance of both regressions.2
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 Table 3. Injury and Fatality Accident Rate
Regression Results
Variable
COLLAV
DIAGN
OBCMON
SAFEMEET
FLEETSPEED
APRENT
OTP
SAFESTRAT
LTL
OOP
UNION
SIZE
R-Square=0. 1626
Adj. R-Square=0. 1426
N=516
Regression CoefficientT-Statistic
(Standard Error)(Significance)
-0.54231 -1.53
(0.35495) (0.1272)
-0.08844 -0.90
(0.09803) (0.3674)
-0.07609 -1.10
(0.06905) (0.27 10)
0.29961 3.09
(0.09701) (0.0021)
-0.31415 -3.85
(0.08153) (0.0001)
-0.13297 -2.09
(0.06366) (0.0372)
0.10739 1.53
(0.07012) (0.1263)
-0.35727 -2.91
(0.12284) (0.0038)
0.18369 1.77
(0.10351) (0.0766)
-0.31519 -3.46
(0.09 106) (0.0006)
-0.35258 -4.50
(0.07838) (<.000 1)
-0.00055 -1.68
(0.000328) (0.0929)
F Statistic=8.14
(Significance= <.0001)
27The percentage change interpretation of dummy variables is based on
Kennedy's unbiased approximate estimator, along with standard error and variance
from the Garderen and Shah (2002) unbiased approximate estimator of the variance are
reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Some of the percentage effects seem quite dramatic. In particular, COLLAV
(controlling for other variables in the model) reduces carrier injury accident rate by over
fifty percent. While this result seems quite remarkable, the accompanying
approximation for unbiased variance and standard error is quite large. This illustrates
the value of the newly proposed approximate unbiased estimator for the variance.
Caution should be used when interpreting the percentage effects of dummy variables
when the estimated variance is large. This is true even when the OLS estimated
coefficient is statistically significant (Garderen & Shah, 2002). Notable percentage
changes with relatively low approximated variance are UNTON and FLEETSPEED.
Both of these variables have OLS coefficients significant at the 0.01 level, and both
roughly reduce the firm accident rate by thirty percent.
Often, when using firm-level data, heteroscedasticity may become a problem
due to variation caused by firm size. Goldfeld-Quant and Breusch-Pagan tests for
heteroscedasticity were performed on both models to test for this possibility. The
Goldfeld-Quant test was performed with respect to the data sorted by firm size (total
assets). The resulting Goldfeld-Quant statistics from testing the disturbances of a
regression of the lower quartile and compared to the disturbances from a regression on
the upper quartile of data is F[1 16,1161=0.793 for the IA model and F{1 16,1161=0.792
for the FAJA model. The critical value is 1.357, so the hypothesis of homoscedasticity
is not rejected. Multiple Breusch-Pagan tests were performed. First the entire set of
regressors, a second test with only the continuous regressors (SIZE and OOP) and a
third test on SIZE only. All three of these tests, for both regressions, also fail to reject
the hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Based on these tests it is concluded that
heteroscedasticity is not a problem for inferences based on the results of this model
(Greene, 2000, pp. 507-510).29
Table 4. Injury Accident Rate Regression
Percentage Effect Results
Variable Percentage ChangeStandard ErrorVariance
(Kennedy's Approx.)(Approx. UnbiasedEstimator)
COLLAV -54.57% 29.76 885.81
DIAGN -8.99% 15.92 253.34
OBCMON -7.20% 11.42 130.31
SAFEMEET 31.56% 22.80 519.65
FLEETSPEED -27.40% 10.55 111.30
APRENT -11.38% 10.05 100.98
OTP 11.84% 13.97 195.23
SAFESTRAT -30.76% 15.19 230.89
LTL 15.19% 21.28 452.68
UNION -32.16% 9.48 89.8130
Table 5. Injury and Fatality Accident Rate Regression
Percentage Effect Results
Variable Percentage ChangeStandard ErrorVariance
(Kennedy's Approx.)(Approx. UnbiasedEstimator)
COLLAV -45.41% 34.74 1206.80
DIAGN -8.90% 15.51 240.41
OBCMON -7.55% 11.07 122.55
SAFEMEET 34.30% 22.62 511.64
FLEETSPEED -27.20% 10.30 106.04
APRENT -12.63% 9.64 93.00
OTP 11.06% 13.51 182.40
SAFESTRAT -30.57% 14.83 219.91
LTL 19.52% 21.49 461.67
UNION -27.34% 11.48 131.8931
Conclusion
Motor carrier managers have a range of safety practices and technologies to
choose among to reduce their earner accident rate. This paper finds that fleet speed
limits, safety performance marketing strategies, apprenticeship training programs, and
collision avoidance systems are negatively related to earner accident rates. The finn
characteristics of unionization, safety performance marketing strategy, and use of
owner-operators also significantly reduce carrier accident rates. The results find that the
safety practice of firm safety meetings is the only variable significantly related to higher
firm accident rates.
New technologies in the motor carrier industry promise exciting safety gains in
the future. The relatively low adoption rates of such technologies limited the empirical
analysis of technologies in this study. As adoption rates increase it will be important for
further evaluation of the safety effects of new technologies, particularly with respect to
the use of technology in government inspection programs.
The results show that firms with the safety performance marketing strategy have
significantly lower accident rates. This supports the contention that firm management
policies can directly impact the safety performance of the firm. hi future studies it
would be interesting to examine the cost structure of firms with a safety performance
marketing strategy, particularly whether firms are able to recoup additional safety
expenditures through rate differentials, reduced insurance costs, andlor reduced accident
costs.
This study finds strong evidence that use of owner-operators reduces carrier
accident rates. The principal-agent theory, contractual relationships, ownership
structure, and firm size are areas for future motor carrier safety research. Though drivers
resist monitoring technologies, it is likely that manager incentives to use such
technologies will make on-board computers conmionplace in the industry. This will
likely have a significant impact on use of owner-operators.32
It is clear that unions have successfully served their role in providing for
worker safety. Evidence has demonstrated that unionized firms have different cost
structures than non-unionized firms, resulting in higher firm operating costs(Kerkvhet
& McMullen, 1997). Union participation has declined dramatically sincederegulation
and as firms struggle to reduce operating costs the trend of decreasing unionizationis
likely to continue. Though union work rules may restrict operating flexibility, managers
should evaluate and then incorporate union rules, which increase safety withouthurting
the competitiveness of the firm.
The results show a significant relationship between fleet speed limits and lower
carrier accident rates. Fleet speed limits may reflect a greater 'safety culture' ofthe
firm, but more importantly this result reinforces the common knowledge that speedis a
factor in most serious motor vehicle accidents. Within a ruthlessly competitiveindustry
that strives for on-time performance and short turn around schedules to meet theshipper
needs for fast service and just-in-time inventories, it is important to emphasize theneed
to drive at reasonable speeds. The significance of firm fleetspeed limits also highlights
the necessity of adequate highway speed limit enforcement and hours-of-service
regulations.
If firm safety meetings are in fact an Occupational Health and Safety
Administration work rule then the positive relationship between safety meetings and
carrier accident rates indicates the need to evaluate the effectiveness of such mandatory
government regulations. This unpredicted result may also indicate afailure in the data
to distinguish between varying levels of activities within the safetypractice. For all of
the attention motor carrier safety receivesas an industry priority, from thepublic and
from government safety regulators, there has been relatively little recent literature on
the subject. Motor carrier accident rate data is plentiful and independent economic
policy evaluation is desperately lacking (Hauer, 1989; Moses & Savage, 1997).33
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